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Introduction 
On July 31st, 2017, Mr. Richard Smith, then CEO of Equifax, 
woke up thinking it would be a normal Monday.1 He went to work 
and held a seemingly routine meeting with the company’s Chief 
Information Officer [“CIO”].2 Unfortunately, this was no routine 
meeting: The CIO was informing Mr. Smith that an unknown 
individual accessed the Equifax’s databases.3 However, the CIO 
believed that the scale of the data breach was quite small, with no 
personal information being exposed.4 So, they both concluded that 
there was no reason to panic.5 Nevertheless, pursuant to the 
company’s internal protocol, Equifax retained both a law firm and 
a cybersecurity firm to begin investigating what had occurred and, 
more importantly, how broad the damage was.6 For the next 
several weeks, investigators worked around the clock, rebuilding 
every command that was issued and finding out exactly what 
happened.7 Finally, on August 15th, Mr. Smith’s worst fear was 
realized: Personal information was indeed stolen from the Equifax 
databases.8 
The story the investigators pieced together is as follows. In 
March 2017, the United States Department of Homeland Security 
                                                                                                     
 1. Richard F. Smith, Prepared Testimony of Richard F. Smith Before the 
U.S. House Committee on Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Digital 
Commerce and Consumer Protection 3 (Oct. 3, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) 
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20171003/106455/HHRG-115-IF17-
Wstate-SmithR-20171003.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 2. Id. at 3. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at 4. 
 8. Id. 
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found a major security vulnerability in a common business server 
platform called Apache Struts.9 A letter was sent out to all major 
businesses that use Apache Struts to make sure a fix was 
implemented as soon as possible.10 Equifax got the letter, but, for 
some unknown reason, did nothing in response.11 In May, two 
months after Homeland Security’s letter, hackers used this 
vulnerability to gain access to the Equifax systems, quickly 
installing a backdoor.12 This meant that even if Equifax then 
patched their systems to fix the Apache Struts issue, it was too 
late, the hackers were in.13 The hackers then handed the reins over 
to a more sophisticated hacking group and, for the next few 
months, the new group rooted around Equifax’s systems.14 By the 
time the hackers were discovered, they had stolen or otherwise 
accessed roughly 143 million people’s personal information: A third 
of the United States’ population.15 On September 7th, Equifax 
announced to the world what had happened.16 In response, Mr. 
Smith was compelled to testify before Congress and later resigned 
as CEO of Equifax.17 
This was not the first time valuable financial information has 
been illegally accessed.18 Three years ago, Yahoo!’s databases were 
hacked and every one of Yahoo!’s 3,000,000,000 email accounts 
                                                                                                     
 9. Id. at 2–3. 
 10. Id. at 3. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See Michael Riley, Jordan Robertson, & Anita Sharp, The Equifax Hack 
Has the Hallmarks of State-Sponsored Pros, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 29, 
2017 9:09 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2017-09-29/the-
equifax-hack-has-all-the-hallmarks-of-state-sponsored-pros (explaining the fact 
that it was too late to fix the vulnerability in the Equifax system once hacked) (on 
file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 14. See id. (“[A]s the attack escalated over the following months, that first 
group—known as an entry crew—handed off to a more sophisticated team of 
hackers.”). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Smith, supra note 1, at 5 (“On September 7, 2017, Equifax publicly 
announced the breach through a nationwide press release.”). 
 17. Id. at 1. 
 18. See Nicole Perlroth, All 3 Billion Yahoo Accounts Were Affected by 2013 
Attack, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/03/technology/yahoo-hack-
3-billion-users.html (last updated Oct. 3, 2017) (explaining the story of the most 
recent Yahoo! hack and the subsequent history) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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were accessed.19 The thieves made off with names, birth dates, 
phone numbers, security question answers, and backup email 
addresses used to reset lost passwords.20 While this information 
seems unimportant, it becomes particularly damaging when 
taking into account that it could be used to access other, more 
important systems, such as government computers.21 Indeed, an 
Eastern European hacking collective has reportedly sold this 
information at least three times, and it is unknown what the 
buyers will do with that data.22 Unfortunately for everyone, these 
are only a few of the many examples of hackers compromising 
systems to illicitly obtain information for financial benefit.23 
Hackers have also attacked systems to reveal secrets that 
have significantly less economic value.24 The largest example of 
this was the Ashley Madison hack.25 Ashley Madison is a 
well-known website that has one purpose: Facilitate affairs 
between married individuals.26 Because of its unique goal, privacy 
is incredibly important.27 Yet, in 2015, a group called “Impact 
Team” hacked into Ashley Madison’s servers and accessed the 
names, phone numbers, and credit card information of the site’s 
                                                                                                     
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See id. (explaining the information obtained would be useful to a hacker 
trying to access government computers). 
 22. See id. (“[L]ast August, a hacking collective based in Eastern Europe 
quietly began offering Yahoo’s information for sale.”) 
 23. See, e.g., Nick Wells, How the Yahoo Hack Stacks Up to Previous Data 
Breaches, CNBC (Oct. 4, 2017, 12:25 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/10/04/how-
the-yahoo-hack-stacks-up-to-previous-data-breaches.html (listing other 
examples of unauthorized data access and subsequent disclosure by third parties) 
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 24. See Tom Lamont, Life After the Ashley Madison Affair, GUARDIAN (Feb. 
27, 2016 7:05 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/feb/28/what-
happened-after-ashley-madison-was-hacked (explaining the story of how Ashley 
Madison was hacked and the subsequent history) (on file with the Washington & 
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 25. See id. (“[H]ackers leaked the names of 30 million people who had used 
the infidelity website Ashley Madison.”). 
 26. See id. (explaining the intention of Ashley Madison to help married 
people have affairs with each other). 
 27. See id. (“Ashley Madison claimed to have an international membership 
of 37.6 million, all of them assured that their use of this service would be 
anonymous, 100% discreet.”). 
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roughly 37 million users.28 They even had some information on 
users’ height, weight, and erotic preferences.29 Impact Team then 
threatened to publicly release this information unless Ashley 
Madison shut down.30 Ashley Madison refused, so, on August 18th, 
Impact Team released the information.31 The released names 
included senior executives, priests, celebrities, military members, 
and the list goes on.32 Those revealed were publicly shamed and 
ridiculed.33 In Alabama, for example, a newspaper printed all the 
names of those who were using the website and lived in the area.34 
Marriages were destroyed, business executives resigned, and some 
people even committed suicide.35  
These high-profile hacks are not uncommon.36 In fact, 
according to the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, there have been at 
least 7,961 data breaches, exposing over 10,000,000,000 accounts 
in total, since 2005.37 These shocking numbers are not particularly 
surprising when taking into account the value of information 
stolen.38 For example, cell phone numbers, as exposed in the 
                                                                                                     
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See id. (“[P]oliticians, priests, military members, civil servants, 
celebrities–these and hundreds of other public figures were found among the 
listed membership.”). 
 33. See id. (“Moral crusaders, operating with impunity, began to shame and 
squeeze the exposed.”). 
 34. See id. (“In Alabama editors at a newspaper decided to print in its pages 
all the names of people from the region who appeared on Ashley Madison’s 
database.”). 
 35. See id. (describing the unfortunate aftermath of the information leak). 
 36. See Wells, supra note 23 (listing other examples of unauthorized data 
accesses and subsequent disclosure by third parties). 
 37. See Data Breaches, PRIVACY RTS. CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://www.privacyrights.org/data-breaches (last visited Feb. 21, 2018) (listing 
the number of publicly disclosed data breaches and how many accounts have been 
exposed from them) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 38. See CESAR CERRUDO & ESTEBAN MARTINEZ FAYO, HACKING DATABASES FOR 
OWNING YOUR DATA 3 (2007), https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-europe-
07/Cerrudo/Whitepaper/bh-eu-07-cerrudo-WP-up.pdf (listing the value of various 
personal information on the black market) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
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Yahoo! hack above, are worth $10 a piece on the black market.39 
The Yahoo! hack exposed 3,000,000,000 phone numbers.40 Taking 
that number and multiplying it by the value of a cell phone 
number, $10, the hackers stood to make $30,000,000,000 from that 
one hack. That dollar amount does not even consider copies the 
hackers could make and later resell. Yet while these hackers make 
astronomical payoffs, the release of this information damages 
people’s lives in multiple ways.41 Some suffer immense emotional 
turmoil, others are left in financial ruin.42 Nevertheless, there is a 
deep circuit split as to whether the fact that information was stolen 
is intrinsically sufficient to grant standing to those whose 
information was stolen to sue the hacked entity.43 In particular, 
                                                                                                     
 39. See id. (listing the value of cell phone numbers on the black market). 
 40. See Nicole Perlroth, supra note 18 (listing the number of Yahoo! accounts 
compromised). 
 41. See Lamont, supra note 24 (explaining the damage caused by the Ashley 
Madison hack); see also Riley, Robertson, & Sharp, supra note 13 (explaining the 
damage caused by the Equifax hack). 
 42. See Lamont, supra note 24 (explaining the damage caused by the Ashley 
Madison hack); see also Riley, Robertson, & Sharp, supra note 13 (explaining the 
damage caused by the Equifax hack). 
 43. Compare Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 276–77 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 
137 S. Ct. 2307 (2017) (finding that the threat of injury was too speculative to 
grant standing to plaintiffs whose data was illicitly accessed by third parties 
while in the care of the defending party), and In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 
771–72 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding that the threat of injury was too speculative to 
grant standing to plaintiffs whose data was stolen from defendant); and Reilly v. 
Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 46 (3d. Cir. 2011) (same), with Galaria v. Nationwide 
Mutual Insurance Comp., 663 F. App’x 384, 390–91 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding that 
there is sufficient injury to grant standing when a plaintiff’s information is 
illegally stolen from the defending party), and Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, 
LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding the injury requirement satisfied 
when a plaintiff’s information is illegally stolen from the defending party because 
there is a “substantial risk” that future harm will occur (quoting Clapper v. 
Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013) (internal quotation marks 
omitted))), and Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“If a plaintiff faces ‘a credible threat of harm’ and that harm is ‘both real and 
immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical,’ the plaintiff has met the 
injury-in-fact requirement for standing under Article III . . . . On these 
facts . . . Plaintiffs . . . have sufficiently alleged an injury-in-fact for purposes of 
Article III standing.” (first quoting Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 
306 F.3d 938, 950 (9th Cir. 2002); and then quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 
461 U.S. 95, 102 (1938))), and Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017) (finding sufficient injury to grant standing for plaintiffs whose 
information was hacked from defendant, particularly noting the costs plaintiffs 
incurred to mitigate future damages). 
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the question becomes, “is the increased risk of future injury enough 
to grant standing?”44 In Part I of this note, I will briefly discuss the 
history of constitutional standing and the current test. In Part II, 
I will explain the aforementioned circuit split. In Part III of this 
note, I will argue why the courts should answer the question above 
in the affirmative: The increased risk of future injury is sufficient 
to grant standing. In Part IV, I will argue alternative ways that 
courts could and should find sufficient injury to grant standing if 
the significantly increased risk of future injury is not enough. I 
note at the outset that this note only deals with the question of 
standing, not necessarily the merits of any case or any other 
possible defenses, such as sovereign immunity or the economic loss 
rule. 
I. Traditional Standing Requirements 
A. History of Standing 
The United States Constitution limits courts to only hear 
“cases” and “controversies.”45 Whether a lawsuit is a case or 
controversy, as defined above, is the question of standing.46 That 
question is a threshold one.47 It must be resolved before deciding 
the merits on a case, even if neither party challenges it.48 Modern 
constitutional standing first began in the case of Fairchild v. 
Hughes,49 where the Supreme Court ruled that a plaintiff must 
have a direct injury to sue.50 It was later reinforced in 
                                                                                                     
 44. See, e.g., Beck, 848 F.3d at 276–77 (finding that the threat of injury was 
too speculative to grant standing to plaintiffs whose data was illicitly accessed by 
third parties while in the care of the defending party (emphasis added)). 
 45. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all 
Cases [and] . . . controversies.”).  
 46. See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“[S]etting apart 
the ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies’ that are of the justiciable sort referred to in Article 
III . . . is the doctrine of standing.” (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1)). 
 47. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271 (1979) (addressing preliminary 
questions of standing before addressing the merits of the case, even though 
neither party challenged standing). 
 48. See id. (same).  
 49. See Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129–130 (1922) (ruling that a 
private citizen cannot challenge the validity of a statute or a constitutional 
amendment without direct injury). 
 50. See id. at 129 (finding that a private citizen cannot sue to stop a statute 
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Massachusetts v. Mellon.51 From there, standing evolved, 
eventually becoming the modern three part test of Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife.52 
B. Current Standing Requirement 
The current constitutional minimum for standing has three 
elements: 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection 
between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury 
has to be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the 
defendant . . . . Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely 
speculative, that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable 
decision.53 
The plaintiff must prove each element.54 Although, “general 
factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct 
may suffice.”55 If there is no standing, the judicial system cannot 
hear the case for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.56 
In Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,57 the U.S. Supreme Court 
further explained the “injury in fact” requirement for standing.58 
                                                                                                     
from passing without a direct injury). 
 51. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (finding that the 
constitution’s separation of powers requires the judicial system to only hear cases 
where an individual has been directly injured). 
 52. See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (ruling that 
plaintiffs must be injured, that injury must have been caused by the defendant, 
and a favorable ruling can redress the injury). 
 53. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citations omitted). 
 54. See id. at 561 (“The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden 
of establishing these elements.”). 
 55. Id. 
 56. See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 624 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(concluding that without Article III standing, the judicial system loses 
subject-matter jurisdiction (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560–61)). 
 57. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 422 (2013) (holding that 
the respondents lacked Article III standing because future injury was not 
imminent). 
 58. See id. at 409 (explaining further how to satisfy the injury-in-fact 
requirement). 
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Specifically, the Court said “‘threatened injury must be certainly 
impending to constitute injury in fact,’ and that ‘[a]llegations of 
possible future injury’ are not sufficient.”59 Courts subsequently 
interpreted this to mean that the injury requirement is fulfilled if 
it is found that there is a substantial risk for future harm to occur, 
even if it is not a complete certainty.60 
The Supreme Court further elucidated this requirement in 
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.61 As stated before, the injury (or threat of 
future injury) must be both particularized and concrete.62 For an 
injury to be particularized “[the injury] must affect the plaintiff in 
a personal and individual way.”63 While particularized is 
important, it is different from concrete.64 A concrete injury is an 
injury that is “real, and not abstract.”65 However, “concrete” is not 
necessarily synonymous with “tangible.”66 While tangible is easy 
to recognize as a “concrete” injury, there are intangible, concrete 
injuries.67 In determining whether an intangible harm constitutes 
an injury sufficient for Article III standing, the Court gave three 
guides.68 First, “it is instructive to consider whether an alleged 
intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has 
traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in 
English or American courts.”69 Second, “because Congress is well 
                                                                                                     
 59. Id. (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)). 
 60. See, e.g., Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Comp., 663 F. App’x 384, 388 
(6th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he Supreme Court has also ‘found standing based on a 
substantial risk that the harm will occur’ . . . even where it is not ‘literally certain 
the harms . . . will come about.’”) (internal citations omitted).  
 61. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (explaining the 
nuances of the injury requirement of constitutional standing). 
 62. See id. (“To establish injury in fact, a plaintiff must show that he or she 
suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and 
particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. (“Particularization is necessary to establish injury in fact, but it 
is not sufficient.”). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1549. 
 67. See id. (“Although tangible injuries are perhaps easier to recognize, we 
have confirmed in many of our previous cases that intangible injuries can 
nevertheless be concrete.”). 
 68. See id. (presenting the three requirements for an intangible harm to 
constitute an injury in order to satisfy Article III standing). 
 69. Id. 
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positioned to identify intangible harms that meet minimum Article 
III standing requirements, its judgment is also instructive and 
important.”70 Lastly, common law can also create intangible harms 
that satisfy the injury requirement of Article III standing.71 
With this precedent in mind, the Supreme Court created two 
tests to determine if future injury satisfies the injury-in-fact 
standing requirement: The “certainly impending” and “substantial 
risk” tests.72 The “certainly impending” test requires that the 
injury does not rely upon a “highly attenuated chain of 
possibilities” and is imminent.73 The “substantial risk” test 
requires a finding that there is a “substantial risk that the harm 
will occur.”74 If either test is satisfied, there is sufficient injury to 
satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of standing.75 
II. Case Law Examining This Issue 
As mentioned above, there is a circuit split on this issue of 
standing in data breach cases.76 The Fourth, Eighth, and Third 
Circuits have each ruled that plaintiffs have no standing to sue an 
entity when the plaintiff’s information was illegally stolen from 
that entity.77 Those courts concluded that there had not yet been 
                                                                                                     
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. (“[T]he law has long permitted recovery by certain tort victims 
even if their harms may be difficult to prove or measure.”). 
 72. See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) 
(ruling that a plaintiff can establish sufficient injury to grant standing by 
satisfying either the “certainly impending” or “substantial risk” test). 
 73. See Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410–14 (2013) 
(explaining the “certainly impending” test). 
 74. See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 n.5 (explaining the “substantial risk” test). 
 75. See Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2341 (ruling that a plaintiff can establish 
sufficient injury to grant standing by satisfying either the “certainly impending” 
or “substantial risk” test). 
 76. See cases cited supra note 43 and accompanying text (illustrating the 
circuit split on the issue of standing in data breach cases). 
 77. See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 771–72 (8th Cir. 2017) (finding 
that the threat of injury was too speculative to grant standing to plaintiffs whose 
data was stolen from defendant); see also Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 46 
(3d Cir. 2011) (same); Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 276–77 (4th Cir. 2017) 
(finding that the threat of injury was too speculative to grant standing to plaintiffs 
whose data was illicitly accessed by third parties while in the care of the defending 
party). 
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an injury under law. However, when the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits examined this legal issue, each found sufficient injury to 
confer standing.78 As will be explained below, the significantly 
increased chances of future injury should be enough to satisfy the 
injury-in-fact requirement. 
A. Cases That Failed to Find Standing 
1. Beck v. McDonald79 
The Fourth Circuit recently addressed this question in Beck v. 
McDonald.80 On February 11, 2013, a laptop was stolen from Dorn 
VAMC’s Respiratory Therapy Department.81 The laptop contained 
unencrypted personal information of approximately 7,400 
patients.82 This personal information included names, birth dates, 
the last four digits of social security numbers, and certain physical 
descriptors.83 Further investigation revealed that Dorn VAMC 
failed to follow standard policies and procedures to ensure safe 
                                                                                                     
 78. See Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Comp., 663 F. App’x 384, 
390–91 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding that there is sufficient injury to grant standing 
when a plaintiff’s information is illegally stolen from the defending party); see also 
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding 
the injury requirement satisfied when a plaintiff’s information is illegally stolen 
from the defending party because there is a “substantial risk” that future harm 
will occur (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013) 
(internal quotation marks omitted))); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 
1142 (9th Cir. 2010) (“If a plaintiff faces ‘a credible threat of harm’ and that harm 
is ‘both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical,’ the plaintiff has met 
the injury-in-fact requirement for standing under Article III . . . . On these 
facts . . . Plaintiffs . . . have sufficiently alleged an injury-in-fact for purposes of 
Article III standing.” (first quoting Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 
306 F.3d 938, 950 (9th Cir. 2002); and then quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 
461 U.S. 95, 102 (1938))); Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir. 
2017) (finding sufficient injury to grant standing for plaintiffs whose information 
was hacked from defendant, particularly noting the costs plaintiffs incurred to 
mitigate future damages). 
 79. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 80. See generally id. (finding that the threat of injury was too speculative to 
grant standing to plaintiffs whose data was illicitly accessed by third parties 
while in the care of the defending party). 
 81. Id. at 267. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
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storage of patient information.84 In response, Richard Beck and 
Lakeshia Jeffery, two individuals whose information was exposed, 
filed a class action lawsuit.85 
In July 2014, a similar fact pattern occurred: Four boxes were 
discovered missing, again from Dorn VAMC.86 Those reports 
contained identifying information of over 2,000 patients, including 
names, social security numbers, and medical diagnoses.87 In 
response, Beverly Watson, an individual whose information was 
now exposed, brought a separate class action lawsuit.88 
In both cases, the claims were dismissed for want of standing, 
relying upon Clapper’s explanation on how future injury can 
convey standing.89 Both Beck and Watson appealed to the Fourth 
Circuit and their appeals were consolidated to the present case.90 
Their argument was that the increased risk of future identity theft 
is sufficient injury or, in the alternative, the cost of protecting 
against the same is also sufficient injury.91 
The Fourth Circuit began by examining the requirements of 
standing, focusing on the injury-in-fact requirement.92 The court 
noted at the offset that “threatened rather than actual injury can 
satisfy Article III standing requirements.”93 However, “not all 
threatened injuries constitute an injury-in-fact.”94 Ultimately, the 
Fourth Circuit focused its analysis on whether either alleged 
“injury”—the data breach itself or the cost to protect against future 
identity theft—was a “distinct and palpable [injury], as opposed to 
[a] merely abstract [one.]”95 
                                                                                                     
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 268. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. at 268–69 (ruling the Beck plaintiffs lacked standing under the 
Privacy Act). 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 273 (discussing Petitioner’s argument that increased risk of 
future identity theft and the cost of protecting against it constitutes injury). 
 92. See id. at 270 (“We focus our inquiry on the first element of Article III 
standing: injury-in-fact.”). 
 93. Id. at 271 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Gaston Copper Recycling, 
Corp., 204 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). 
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Turning first to the increased risk of future identity theft, the 
Fourth Circuit noted the deepening circuit split on this issue.96 The 
court then differentiated the current case from the cases where 
standing was found by ruling that in the other cases, the hacker 
“intentionally targeted the personal information compromised in 
the data breaches” as opposed to this fact pattern.97 Specifically, 
the Fourth Circuit looked at four cases where standing was found: 
Galaria v. Nationwide Ins. Comp.,98 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus 
Group, LLC,99 Pisciotta v. Old Nat. Bancorp,100 and Krottner v. 
Starbucks Corp.101 The court pointed out that in Galaria, “hackers 
broke into Nationwide’s computer network and stole the personal 
information of Plaintiffs and 1.1 million others,” which did not 
happen here.102 In Remijas, the Fourth Circuit noted that the only 
logical conclusion for hackers to break into a store’s database and 
steal consumer private information is to target personal 
information; again, the Fourth Circuit said this is not present 
here.103 In Pisciotta, the court said that the “scope and manner of 
intrusion into [the] banking website’s hosting facility was 
sophisticated, intentional, and malicious,” which, according to the 
Fourth Circuit, did not happen here.104 Lastly, in “Krottner, at least 
                                                                                                     
 96. Id. at 273 (“Our sister circuits are divided on whether a plaintiff may 
establish an Article III injury-in-fact based on an increased risk of future identity 
theft.”). 
 97. Id. at 274. 
 98. See Galaria v. Nationwide Ins. Comp., 663 Fed. App’x 384, 391 (6th Cir. 
2016) (ruling that plaintiffs have Article III standing to bring their action 
involving a data hack). 
 99. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 
2015) (ruling that customers have Article III standing to bring their action by 
showing a substantial risk of harm from the store's date breach). 
 100. See Pisciotta v. Old Nat. Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) 
(“[T]he injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied by a threat of future harm or 
by an act which harms the plaintiff only by increasing the risk of future harm 
that the plaintiff would have otherwise faced, absent the defendant's actions.”). 
 101. See id. (comparing the present case with other cases that addressed the 
same legal question). 
 102. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274 (4th Cir. 2017) (citing Galaria v. 
Nationwide Insurance Comp., 663 Fed. App’x 384, 386 (6th Cir. 2016)). 
 103. See id. (“In . . . Remijas, . . . the data thief intentionally targeted the 
personal information compromised in the data breaches. . . . Here, the Plaintiffs 
make no such claims.”) (citing Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 
688, 694 (7th Cir. 2015)). 
 104. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Pisciotta v. Old Nat. Bancorp, 
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one named plaintiff alleged misuse or access of that personal 
information [stolen] by the thief,” implying the hacker targeted the 
information used.105 As of the Fourth Circuit’s decision, there had 
not been a case of identity theft yet in Beck.106 
Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the data thief in 
Beck did not target the laptop, or boxes, for its personal 
information and, therefore, the increased chance of future identity 
theft is not a sufficient enough injury-in-fact to confer standing.107 
Notwithstanding the fact that the laptop was deemed to have been 
stolen, the court focused on the concept that an “attenuated chain 
of possibilities” would have to occur for Plaintiffs to be subject to 
identity theft.108 Such “attenuated chain of possibilities” is not 
sufficient to confer standing.109 
Having walked through the “certainly impending” test, the 
Fourth Circuit continued by analyzing the “substantial risk” 
standard set forth by Clapper.110 The Plaintiffs alleged that 33% of 
those affected will become victims of identity theft.111 The court, 
however, quickly devalued that argument by interpreting Clapper 
as setting an incredibly high bar to reach in order to obtain 
standing requirement.112 Consequently, Plaintiffs were found to 
                                                                                                     
499 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
 105. See id. (“[N]amed plaintiff alleged that, two months after theft of laptop 
containing his social security number, someone attempted to open a new account 
using his social security number.” (citing Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 
1139, 1141 (9th Cir. 2010)). 
 106. See id. (concluding that no plaintiff has alleged that her data has been 
stolen). 
 107. See id. (“Here, the Plaintiffs make no such claims [of the data thief 
intentionally targeting the personal information or of misuse of stolen data by the 
thief]. This in turn renders their contention of an enhanced risk of future identity 
theft too speculative.”). 
 108. See id. at 275 (“[F]or the Plaintiffs to suffer the harm of identity 
theft . . . we must engage with the same ‘attenuated chain of possibilities’ rejected 
by the [U.S. Supreme] Court in Clapper.” (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 
133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147–48 (2013))). 
 109. See id. (same). 
 110. See id. (“Nonetheless, our inquiry on standing is not at an end, for we 
may also find standing based on ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur, which 
in turn may prompt a party to reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid that 
harm.” (quoting Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1150 n.5)). 
 111. Id. at 275–76. 
 112. See id. at 276 (“[W]e read Clapper[] . . . to express the common-sense 
notion that a threatened event can be ‘reasonably likely’ to occur but still be 
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not have satisfied the injury requirement of standing with the 
increased risk of future identity theft.113 
The Fourth Circuit briefly looked at Plaintiff’s second 
argument: The cost of mitigative measures is sufficient injury to 
confer standing.114 However, that argument was summarily 
rejected as the court said, “[these] self-imposed harms cannot 
confer standing.”115 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit found that 
Plaintiffs did not have standing here to sue.116 
2. In re SuperValu, Inc.117 
A similar legal issue was posed to the Eight Circuit in In re 
SuperValu, Inc.118 SuperValu, Inc. [hereinafter “SuperValu”] was 
the victim of two cyberattacks in 2014.119 The first occurred from 
June 22, 2014 to July 17, 2014.120 During that time, hackers 
installed malicious software on SuperValu’s computers that 
allowed them to gain access to and then steal the payment 
information of SuperValu’s customers.121 This included the 
customer’s names, credit or debit card account numbers, expiration 
dates, card verification value codes, and personal identification 
numbers.122 On August 14, 2014, SuperValu issued a press release 
                                                                                                     
insufficiently ‘imminent’ to constitute an injury-in-fact.”(citing Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 
at 1147–48)). 
 113. See id. (finding that none of the arguments set forth by Plaintiffs 
regarding the increased risk of future harm is sufficient injury to grant standing). 
 114. See id. at 276–77 (“Next, we turn to the Plaintiffs’ allegation that they 
have suffered an injury-fin-fact because they have incurred or will in the future 
incur the cost of measures to guard against identity theft, including the costs of 
credit monitoring services.”). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. (affirming the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs did not 
have standing to pursue their claims). 
 117. In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 118. See id. at 770–72 (discussing whether the increased risk of future 
identity theft stemming from a data breach is sufficient to grant standing to those 
whose information was stolen). 
 119. Id. at 766. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
258 25 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 243 (2018)  
 
notifying customers of the intrusion.123 SuperValu also noted that 
they were conducting an on-going investigation into the 
incident.124  
On September 29, 2014, SuperValu announced that a second 
data breach took place in late August or early September 2014.125 
According to the release, the second data breach126 involved an 
intruder installing malicious software onto the same system that 
was compromised in the first data breach.127 This second type of 
malicious software achieved the same end goals as the first: Allow 
the hackers to have access to customers’ personal card 
information.128 
After the two press releases, Plaintiffs filed suit claiming 
SuperValu failed to take adequate measures to protect customers’ 
card information.129 Because of that failure, Plaintiffs argued that 
they were subjected to an imminent and real possibility of identity 
theft.130 Specifically, the thieves would siphon money from the 
customers’ various accounts, open new accounts, or sell the 
information to others who intend to commit fraud.131 In fact, one of 
the Plaintiffs alleged that there were already fraudulent charges 
on his credit card statement stemming from the initial data 
breaches.132 The district court dismissed the complaint, “finding 
                                                                                                     
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. SuperValu claimed the two breaches were separate, but the Plaintiffs 
disputed that contention in their complaint. Id. It is irrelevant to this note which 
sequence of events is correct. 
 127. See id. (“The press release stated that an intruder installed different 
malicious software onto the same network.”).  
 128. See id. (“Defendants acknowledged that the software may have captured 
Card Information from debit and credit cards used to purchase goods at their 
stores, but at the time of the press release, there had been no determination that 
such information was ‘in fact stolen.’”).  
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 766–67. 
 132. See id. at 767 (“Shortly after the data breach was announced, ‘Holmes 
noticed a fraudulent charge on his credit card statement and immediately 
cancelled his credit card, which took two weeks to replace.’”). 
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that none of the plaintiffs had alleged an injury-in-fact and thus 
did not have standing.”133 Plaintiffs appealed.134 
The Eighth Circuit began its analysis by reiterating the 
abecedarian principles of Article III standing: Injury, causation, 
and redressability.135 In particular, the Eighth Circuit, like the 
Fourth Circuit, analyzed the injury requirement.136 Put another 
way, the court analyzed “whether Plaintiffs’ allegations plausibly 
demonstrate that the risk that plaintiffs will suffer future identity 
theft is substantial.”137 At the outset, the Eighth Circuit concluded 
that the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that their card information 
was stolen by the hackers.138 The court then noted that the plaintiff 
who alleged fraudulent credit card transactions, Holmes, had 
sufficient injury.139 However, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the 
other plaintiffs failed to allege an injury-in-fact with the increased 
risk of future harm.140 This conclusion hinged upon a government 
report analyzing data breaches and their aftermaths.141 
The Eight Circuit first noted, using the government report 
mentioned above, that the information stolen would not allow for 
someone to open new bank accounts without the proper owner’s 
knowledge.142 The court continued by concluding that the findings 
of the GAO report indicate that the odds of someone’s identity 
                                                                                                     
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. at 767–78 (discussing the elements of constitutional standing). 
 136. See id. at 768 (“This case primarily concerns the injury in 
fact . . . element.”). 
 137. Id. at 770. 
 138. See id. at 770 ([W]e are satisfied that the complaint sufficiently alleges 
that the hackers stole plaintiffs’ Card Information.”). 
 139. See id. at 772 (“[P]laintiff Holmes alleges a present injury in fact to 
support his standing.”). 
 140. See id. at 771–72 (“Accordingly, we conclude that the complaint has not 
sufficiently alleged a substantial risk of identity theft, and Plaintiffs’ allegations 
of future injury do not support standing in this case.”). 
 141. See id. at 770–71 (dissecting a 2007 Government Accountability Office 
report on data breaches and determining that it fails to support plaintiffs’ 
contention of sufficient increased risk of future injury) (citing U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-737, PERSONAL INFORMATION: DATA BREACHES ARE 
FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF RESULTING IDENTITY THEFT IS LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE 
FULL EXTENT IS UNKNOWN (2007) [hereinafter “GAO report”]). 
 142. See id. at 770 (“As the GAO report points out, compromised credit or 
debit card information, like the Card Information here, generally cannot be used 
alone to open unauthorized new accounts.” (internal citations omitted)). 
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being taken is too small to satisfy the constitution’s requirements 
for injury-in-fact.143 However, the court also noted that the GAO 
report found that “comprehensive information on the outcomes of 
data breaches is not available . . . and the extent to which data 
breaches result in identity theft is not well known.”144 
Notwithstanding these informational defects within the GAO 
report, the court concluded that the GAO report proves that the 
increased risk of future injury was too speculative to grant 
standing.145 
3. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.146 
The Third Circuit also analyzed this legal issue in Reilly v. 
Ceridian Corp.147 In that case, Ceridian Corp. suffered a security 
breach when an unknown hacker infiltrated the company’s payroll 
system.148 This breach exposed personal and financial information 
of approximately 27,000 employees at 1,900 companies.149 
However, the Court noted that hackers may not have read, copied, 
or understood the data.150 When Ceridian learned of the data 
breach, they informed the victims, and this suit followed.151 
Plaintiffs filed a class action, alleging that they were injured 
by, “an increased risk of identity theft, . . . incurred costs to 
monitor their credit activity, and . . . emotional distress.”152 Like 
the two previous cases mentioned above, the district court 
                                                                                                     
 143. See id. at 771 (discussing the report’s findings on how many data 
breaches are known to have caused identity theft, ultimately concluding that the 
report “does not support the allegation that [SuperValu’s] data breaches create a 
substantial risk that plaintiffs will suffer credit or debit card fraud”). 
 144. Id. at 771 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing GAO report at 21). 
 145. See id. at 771–72 (“Accordingly, we conclude that the complaint has not 
sufficiently alleged a substantial risk of identity theft, and plaintiffs’ allegations 
of future injury do not support standing in this case.”). 
 146. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 147. See generally id. (affirming the District Court’s determination that the 
plaintiffs’ allegations were insufficient to plead actual injury and therefore lacked 
standing).  
 148. Id. at 40. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
BYTES BITE  261 
 
dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims for want of standing.153 Plaintiffs 
appealed.154 
In its inquiry, the Third Circuit also focused on the injury 
requirement of standing.155 Particularly, the Third Circuit 
highlighted the limiting nature of the injury requirement, stating, 
“[a]llegations of possible future injury are not sufficient to satisfy 
Article III.”156 The Third Circuit quickly concluded that Plaintiffs 
“allegations of hypothetical, future injury are insufficient to 
establish standing.”157 Furthermore, they indicated that to 
succeed, the Plaintiffs must have alleged, and later proved, that 
the hacker, “(1) read, copied, and understood their personal 
information; (2) intends to commit future criminal acts by 
misusing the information; and (3) is able to use such information 
to the detriment of [Plaintiffs] by making unauthorized 
transactions in [Plaintiffs’] names.”158  
In its rationale, the Third Circuit distinguishes this case from 
two similar cases where sister circuits had found standing: 
Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp159 and Krottner v. Starbucks 
Corp.160.161 The Third Circuit attempted to differentiate itself from 
Pisciotta by saying, “there was evidence that the hacker’s intrusion 
was sophisticated, intentional and malicious [in that case].”162 The 
Third Circuit then ruled that this was not present here.163 In 
Krottner, there was an attempt “to open a bank account with a 
plaintiff’s information following the physical theft of a laptop.”164 
Again, the Third Circuit ruled this was not present here.165 
                                                                                                     
 153. Id. at 41. 
 154. Id. 
 155. See id. (“Constitutional standing requires an injury-in-fact, which is an 
invasion of a legally protected interest.”). 
 156. Id. at 42 (internal citations omitted). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Pisciotta v. Old Nat’l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 160. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 161. See Reilly, 664 F.3d at 43–44 (explaining how Pisciotta and Krottner are 
different than the case at hand). 
 162. Id. at 44 (citing Pisciotta, 499 F.3d at 632). 
 163. See id. (“Here, there is no evidence that the intrusion was intentional or 
malicious.”). 
 164. Id. (citing Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1142). 
 165. See id. (“[Plaintiffs] have alleged no misuse.”). 
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Lastly, the Third Circuit rejected the argument that Plaintiffs’ 
purchase of identity theft protection is sufficient injury.166 Instead, 
the Third Circuit explained it away as merely “[Plaintiffs] 
prophylactically spen[ding] money to ease fears of future 
third-party criminality.”167 Ultimately, the Third Circuit 
concluded, in affirming the district court’s dismissal: “[T]here is no 
quantifiable risk of damage in the future . . . . Any damages that 
may occur here are entirely speculative and dependent on the skill 
and intent of the hacker.”168 
B. Cases that Find Standing 
1. Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Comp.169 
Multiple Circuit Courts have come to the opposite opinion of 
the Fourth, Eighth, and Third Circuits regarding whether 
increased risk of identity theft is enough of an injury in these types 
of cases.170 In Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Comp., hackers 
breached Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company’s firewall and 
accessed personal information.171 This personal information 
included names, dates of birth, marital statuses, genders, 
occupations, employers, social security numbers, and driver’s 
license numbers.172 Plaintiffs brought suit and alleged that the 
Nationwide breach created an “imminent, immediate and 
continuing risk” that Plaintiffs and other class members would be 
subject to identity fraud.173 Indeed, Plaintiffs pointed to a study 
that concluded, “in 2011 recipients of data-breach notifications 
                                                                                                     
 166. See id. at 45 (“Although [Plaintiffs] have incurred expenses to monitor 
their accounts and to protect their personal and financial information from 
imminent misuse and/or identity theft, they have not done so as a result of any 
actual injury.”). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Comp., 63 F. App’x 384 (6th Cir. 
2016). 
 170. See cases cited supra note 43 and accompanying text (listing the circuit 
split). 
 171. Galaria, 663 F. App’x at 388. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 386. 
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were 9.6 times more likely to experience identity fraud, and had a 
fraud incidence rate of 19%.”174 Beyond that, Plaintiffs alleged that 
they wanted to mitigate this risk of identity fraud by paying an 
average of $354 in out-of-pocket expenses and $1513 in total 
economic loss to obtain identity theft protection.175 It was through 
these two major reasons—increased risk of future injury and the 
mitigation costs to avoid such future injury—that Plaintiffs 
claimed they had satisfied the constitutional requirements of 
standing.176 The district court rejected these arguments and the 
Plaintiffs appealed their case to the Sixth Circuit. 
The Sixth Circuit began its analysis by reiterating the 
principles of constitutional standing, taking particular note of the 
injury requirement.177 The court also took particular note of the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding when future injury 
satisfies the injury requirement of constitutional standing.178 With 
this in mind, the Sixth Circuit concluded that “Plaintiffs’ 
allegations of a substantial risk of harm, coupled with reasonably 
incurred mitigation costs, are sufficient to establish a cognizable 
Article III injury at the pleading stage of litigation.”179 The Sixth 
Circuit pointed out that there is a presumption that when 
information is stolen, it is presumed that it will be used for 
nefarious purposes, such as stealing someone’s identity.180 
Consequently, even though the injury is not “literally certain,” 
there is a “sufficiently substantial risk of harm” that the injury will 
occur.181 
With the injury requirement satisfied, the Sixth Circuit moved 
to the other two requirements of constitutional standing: 
                                                                                                     
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 386–87. 
 177. See id. at 388 (“Injury is the first and foremost of standing’s three 
elements.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 178. See id. (explaining that a substantial risk that future harm will occur is 
sufficient to fulfil constitutional standing). 
 179. Id. 
 180. See id. at 388, 389 (“There is no need for speculation where Plaintiffs 
allege that their data has already been stolen and is now in the hands of 
ill-intentioned criminals . . . . Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or 
later, to make a fraudulent charge or assume those consumers’ identities.”). 
 181. Id. at 388. 
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Causation and redressability.182 The court, however, quickly flew 
through those two requirements and concluded they were 
satisfied.183 The Sixth Circuit then reversed the district court’s 
determination that Plaintiffs did not have standing and 
remanded.184 
2. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC185 
The Seventh Circuit also discussed a similar legal issue in 
Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC.186 The facts of that case 
are as follows. Sometime in 2013, hackers attacked Neiman 
Marcus Group, LLC [hereinafter “NMG”] and stole some of their 
customers’ credit card information.187 In December of that year, 
NMG learned of fraudulent charges showing up on some of its 
customers’ credit cards.188 However, NMG kept that information 
confidential until January the following year.189 The company then 
announced that around 350,000 cards had been exposed and 
approximately 9,200 had already been fraudulently used.190 The 
Plaintiffs here quickly filed suit.191 The district court dismissed the 
claim for want of standing.192 Plaintiffs appealed.193 
The Seventh Circuit undertook the same analysis as the Sixth 
Circuit had taken regarding the increased chance of both future 
injury and current injury.194 In regard to the heightened risk of 
                                                                                                     
 182. See id. at 390–91 (explaining that the injury must be caused by the 
defendants and a favorable decision must be able to redress the injury). 
 183. See id. (explaining that Plaintiff’s injury was caused by the defendant 
and a favorable decision would redress the injury). 
 184. See id. (“Thus, we conclude that Plaintiffs’ complaints adequately allege 
Article III standing.”). 
 185. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 186. See id. at 689–70 (finding that the plaintiff’s showing of a substantial 
risk of harm from the store’s data breach satisfied Article III’s injury 
requirement).  
 187. Id. at 689. 
 188. Id. at 690. 
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See id. at 692 (“These plaintiffs must allege that the data breach 
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future injury, the Seventh Circuit came to a number of conclusions, 
including: 
[R]equiring the plaintiffs to wait for the threatened harm to 
materialize in order to sue would create a different problem: 
[T]he more time that passes between a data breach and an 
instance of identity theft, the more latitude a defendant has to 
argue that the identity theft is not fairly traceable to the 
defendant’s data breach.195 
The court then noted a Government Accountability Office 
Report which concluded that “stolen data may be held for up to a 
year or more before being used to commit identity theft. Further, 
once stolen data have been sold or posted on the Web, fraudulent 
use of that information may continue for years.”196 So, the fact that 
only 9,200 cards have been compromised so far does not preclude 
the significant possibility that more could be injured in the 
future.197 For these reasons, coupled with the presumption that the 
hacker’s intentions were nefarious, the Seventh Circuit concluded 
that there is sufficient injury to grant standing under the 
“certainly impending” test.198 
The Seventh Circuit, however, continued to analyze if 
Plaintiffs’ purchasing of identity theft protection was sufficient.199 
The court noted that “[p]laintiffs cannot manufacture standing by 
incurring costs in anticipation of non-imminent harm.”200 
However, as noted above, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the 
future harm was imminent; therefore, these mitigation costs also 
constitute sufficient injury to confer standing.201 
                                                                                                     
inflicted . . . injury on them; that [Defendant] caused that injury; and that a 
judicial decision can provide redress for them.”). 
 195. Id. at 693. 
 196. Id. at 694. 
 197. See id. (“[T]he complaint asserts that fraudulent charges and identity 
theft can occur long after a data breach.”). 
 198. See id. at 693 (“[P]laintiffs have shown a substantial risk of harm from 
the [Defendant’s] data breach. Why else would hackers break into a store’s 
database and steal consumers’ private information?”). 
 199. See id. at 694 (“In addition to the alleged future injures, the plaintiffs 
assert that they have already lost time and money protecting themselves against 
future identity theft and fraudulent charges.”). 
 200. Id. 
 201. See id. (“An affected customer, having been notified by Neiman Marcus 
that her card is at risk, might think it necessary to subscribe to a service that 
offers monthly credit monitoring.”). 
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Lastly, the Seventh Circuit mentioned an issue that every 
other case had not even addressed: Is private information 
property?202 While the Seventh Circuit bypassed the question and 
dismisses it because the Plaintiffs did not provide any authority 
that would support such a conclusion, it is an interesting 
proposition.203 
3. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.204 
The Ninth Circuit dealt with an analogous legal issue in 
Krottner v. Starbucks Corp.205 The facts of that case are as follows. 
In October 2008, someone stole a laptop from Starbucks that 
contained the unencrypted names, addresses, and social security 
numbers of approximately 97,000 Starbucks employees.206 In 
November of that year, Starbucks sent a letter to those affected, 
alerting them to the theft and stating that Starbucks had “no 
indication that the private information had been misused.”207 
However, Starbucks still told those affected to closely monitor their 
financial accounts for suspicious activity and provided credit watch 
services for the next year.208 Two of the Plaintiffs continued to pay 
out-of-pocket for continued credit watch services after the one year 
of free service concluded and, arguably because of the continued 
surveillance, they had not yet suffered any sort of identity theft at 
the time of the Ninth Circuit’s decision.209 Indeed, there was an 
attempt to open a bank account in one of the Plaintiff’s name and 
social security number, but the bank closed the account before any 
damage could be done.210 Plaintiffs then brought a class action 
                                                                                                     
 202. See id. at 695 (“The plaintiffs also allege that they have a concrete injury 
in the loss of their private information, which they characterize as an intangible 
commodity.”). 
 203. See id. (“Plaintiffs refer us to no authority that would support such a 
finding. We thus refrain from supporting standing on such an abstract injury.”). 
 204. Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 205. See id. at 1142 (“Plaintiffs-Appellants’ remaining allegations concern 
their increased risk of future identity theft.”). 
 206. Id. at 1140. 
 207. Id. at 1140–41. 
 208. See id. at 1141 (referencing a letter Starbucks sent out to those affected). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
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against Starbucks.211 The district court dismissed the complaint 
for failing to allege a cognizable injury under law.212 Plaintiffs 
appealed.213 
The Ninth Circuit began by reanalyzing the district court’s 
determination of Article III standing.214 Again, the court focused 
on the injury requirement.215 In particular, whether the increased 
risk of future identity theft is sufficient even though there has not 
been any actual loss yet.216 The court compared this increased risk 
of future harm to environmental and toxic exposure claims, which 
have legally similar injuries to data breach cases due to a delay in 
occurrence and some uncertainty that injury will ever occur.217 
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
“Plaintiffs-Appellants have alleged a credible threat of real and 
immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing 
their unencrypted personal data.”218 However, the Ninth Circuit 
qualified this result by indicating that if the allegations were more 
conjectural or hypothetical, such as if the laptop had not been 
stolen, but it had been at risk of being stolen at some point, there 
would be no standing.219 
                                                                                                     
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. See id. (“We have an independent obligation to examine standing to 
determine whether it comports with the case or controversy requirement of 
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.”). 
 215. See id. at 1141–42 (“It was undisputed before the district court that 
Plaintiffs-Appellants had sufficiently alleged causation and redressability, the 
second and third standing requirements. We thus turn to the first standing 
requirement: [W]hether Plaintiffs-Appellants adequately alleged an 
injury-in-fact.”). 
 216. See id. at 1142 (explaining the arguments by Plaintiff trying to establish 
standing). 
 217. See id. (concluding that environmental and toxic exposure claims are 
similar because, like the current case, the injury is neither occurring presently 
nor guaranteed to ever occur, but the increased likelihood to cause future injury 
is sufficient to grant standing) (citing Cent. Delta Water Agency v. United States, 
306 F.3d 938, 948–50 (9th Cir. 2002) (adjudicating an environmental claim) & 
Pritikin v. Dep’t of Energy, 254 F.3d 791, 796–97 (9th Cir. 2001) (adjudicating a 
toxic exposure claim)). 
 218. Id. at 1143. 
 219. See id. (“Were Plaintiffs-Appellants’ allegations more conjectural or 
hypothetical—for example, if no laptop had been stolen, and Plaintiffs had sued 
based on the risk that it would be stolen at some point in the future—we would 
find the threat far less credible.”). 
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4. Attias v. Carefirst, Inc.220 
The most recent circuit court to deal with this legal issue was 
the D.C. Circuit in Attias v. Carefirst, Inc.221 In that case, health 
insurer CareFirst, Inc. suffered a cyberattack in which its 
customers’ personal information was allegedly stolen.222 This 
personal information included names, birthdates, email addresses, 
social security numbers, and credit card information.223 The attack 
occurred in June 2014, and the breach was discovered in April 
2015.224 The affected individuals were then informed of the breach 
in May, 2015.225 Plaintiffs soon after brought a class action lawsuit 
against CareFirst, alleging a number of different causes of 
action.226 The district court dismissed the complaint for want of 
standing.227 The Plaintiffs quickly filed an appeal.228 
The D.C. Circuit began by highlighting the injury-in-fact 
requirement of constitutional standing.229 Specifically, whether 
the future injury alleged by Plaintiffs is “actual or imminent” 
enough to confer standing.230 For that, the D.C. Circuit focused on 
the “substantial risk” test.231 
Courts around the country have separately molded the various 
future injury tests that the Supreme Court discussed in Clapper 
and its progeny.232 In the D.C. Circuit, the appropriate method of 
analyzing an “increased-risk-of-harm claim is to consider the 
                                                                                                     
 220. Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017).  
 221. See generally id. (grappling with the legal question of whether data 
breaches are sufficient to grant standing to those affected). 
 222. Id. at 622. 
 223. Id. at 623. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id.  
 227. Id.  
 228. Id. 
 229. See id. at 626 (“This case primarily concerns the injury-in-fact 
requirement.”). 
 230. Id. (“An injury in fact must be concrete, particularized, and, most 
importantly for our purposes, ‘actual or imminent’ rather than speculative.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 231. See id. at 627 (discussing the “substantial risk” test of injury). 
 232. See, e.g., id. (discussing the D.C. Circuit’s precedent regarding the 
“substantial risk” test); see also cases cited supra notes 72–75 and accompanying 
text (explaining the various future injury-in-fact tests). 
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ultimate alleged harm,’ which in this case would be identity theft, 
‘as the . . . injury[,] and then to determine whether the increased 
risk of such harm makes injury to an individual citizen sufficiently 
imminent for standing purposes.’”233 Accordingly, the inquiry then 
turned to whether the plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that there is a 
“substantial risk of identity theft as a result of defendant’s alleged 
negligence.”234 The D.C. Circuit analyzed the complaint and 
concluded that there is “[n]o long sequence of uncertain 
contingencies involving multiple independent actors [that must] 
occur before the plaintiffs in this case will suffer any harm.”235 The 
D.C. Circuit continues, stating, “simply by virtue of the hack and 
the nature of the data that the plaintiffs allege was 
taken . . . . [Plaintiffs] satisfy the requirement of an injury in 
fact.”236 With the injury requirement satisfied, the D.C. Circuit 
quickly disposed of the other standing requirements and ruled that 
the Plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claims.237 
III. Why Courts Should Find the Increased Threat of Future 
Injury Justifies Standing in These Types of Cases 
In Beck, In re SuperValu, Inc., and Reilly (“Non-Standing 
Cases”) there were two common threads of error that Galaria, 
Remijas, Krottner, and Attias (“Standing Cases”) do not have. 
First, the Non-Standing Cases’ incorrectly assumed that hackers’ 
intent may not be malicious.238 Second, the Non-Standing Cases 
improperly focused on the whether any identity theft has occurred, 
rather than focusing on the complexities of the hacking attack.239 
                                                                                                     
 233. Id. (quoting Food & Water Watch v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 915 (D.C. Cir. 
2015)). 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 629. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See id. at 629–30. (describing why the plaintiffs have standing). 
 238. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[P]laintiffs 
have uncovered no evidence that . . . the thief stole the laptop with the intent to 
steal their private information.”); see also In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 769 
(8th Cir. 2017) (requiring Plaintiffs to specifically allege that their information 
was stolen instead of presuming it); Reilly v. Ceridian, 664 F.3d 38, 44 (3d Cir. 
2011) (“Here, there is no evidence that the intrusion was intentional or 
malicious.”). 
 239. See Beck, 848 F.3d at 275 (focusing on whether future identity theft has 
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Instead, the hacking event, by itself, should confer a presumption 
that there is a sufficiently increased chance of future injury so as 
to grant standing. 
A. Courts Should Presume that the Hacker is Planning to Misuse 
the Stolen Data Because Hacking Is a Difficult and Illegal 
Activity 
Turning to the first common error, the Non-Standing Cases 
failed to assume that the hacker had ill-intent in stealing the 
information.240 This is incorrect.  
Hacking a database, particularly overcoming the high level of 
security the defendants in these cases presumably apply, is 
especially difficult.241 Two of the most common types of attacks 
utilized for this special purpose are brute force attacks and trojan 
viruses.242 Both of these methods are neither cheap nor simple, 
requiring a large investment of time.243 
                                                                                                     
occurred); see also In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 769–71 (discussing the 
potential future injury from the hacking); Reilly, 664 F.3d at 43 (same). 
 240. See Beck, 848 F.3d at 274 (“[P]laintiffs have uncovered no evidence 
that . . . . [T]he thief stole the laptop with the intent to steal their private 
information.”); see also In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 769 (requiring Plaintiffs 
to specifically allege that their information was stolen before beginning a 
standing analysis); Reilly, 664 F.3d at 44 (“Here, there is no evidence that the 
intrusion was intentional or malicious.”). 
 241. See CESAR CERRUDO & ESTEBAN MARTINEZ FAYO, HACKING DATABASES FOR 
OWNING YOUR DATA 4–6 (2007), https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-
europe-07/Cerrudo/Whitepaper/bh-eu-07-cerrudo-WP-up.pdf (explaining the 
various ways that hackers illegally access databases and the difficulty of 
performing such hacks) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights 
& Social Justice). 
 242. See id. at 4–5 (describing how databases are hacked and different 
methods that hackers use). 
 243. See How to Crack Passwords, Part 1 (Principles & Technologies), NULL 
BYTE (May 26, 2016, 3:15 PM), https://null-byte.wonderhowto.com/how-to/hack-
like-pro-crack-passwords-part-1-principles-technologies-0156136/ [hereinafter 
How to Crack Passwords] (describing how expensive and complicated brute force 
attacks are) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice); see also SebastianZ, Security 1:1 - Part 2 - Trojans and Other Security 
Threats, SYMANTEC (Dec. 26, 2013), https://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/ 
security-11-part-2-trojans-and-other-threats (“Trojans are generally created by 
malware authors who are organized and aim to make money out of their efforts. 
These types of Trojans can be highly sophisticated and can require more work to 
implement than some of the simpler malware seen on the Internet.”) (on file with 
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A brute force attack is a term used to reference an illegal 
retrieval of passwords.244 It has a simple premise: Attempt all 
possible combinations of letters, numbers, and symbols until the 
correct password is found.245 However, this attack is not always an 
attempt to discover the actual database password, as enterprises 
generally have security against this, but rather, it is generally an 
attempt to decrypt the password file.246 This type of brute force 
attack is called “breaking the hash.”247 Put another way, let us say 
you are attempting to break into a vault.248 This vault requires a 
key to enter.249 If you tried to pick the vault lock a million times, 
the lock would break and restrict access to the vault.250 However, 
next to the entrance of the vault is a safe containing the key 
necessary to enter the vault.251 So, you decide to take the safe home 
and attempt to find the combination.252 You try every single 
combination on the safe and, eventually, it clicks open to reveal the 
key inside.253 You take the key and enter the vault.254 This is, 
conceptually, how a “breaking the hash” brute force attack is 
performed.255 The vault is the database that contains the personal 
information the hackers seek.256 The key is the password needed 
                                                                                                     
the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 244. See How to Crack Passwords, supra note 243 (describing what brute force 
attacks are and how they occur). 
 245. See id. (“Brute force password cracking attempts all possibilities of all 
the letters, number, special characters that might be combined for a password 
and attempts them.”).  
 246. See id. (describing methods of “cracking” passwords). 
 247. See Introduction to Cracking MD5 Encryption—Breaking the Hash 
Functions, BREAKING THE SECURITY (Feb. 16, 2011), 
http://breakthesecurity.cysecurity.org/2011/02/introduction-to-cracking-md5-
encryption- breaking-the-hash-functions.html (explaining the term “breaking the 
hash”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social 
Justice). 
 248. Cf. How to Crack Passwords, supra note 243 (describing what brute force 
attacks are and how they occur). 
 249. Cf. id. (same). 
 250. Cf. id. (same). 
 251. Cf. id. (describing how a password is protected). 
 252. Cf. id. (referencing how hackers work to decode passwords). 
 253. Cf. id. (noting the process hackers use). 
 254. Cf. id. (same). 
 255. Cf. id. (same). 
 256. Cf. id. (same). 
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to open the database.257 The safe protecting the key is the 
encryption utilized on the password.258 Lastly, the combination to 
open the safe is the encryption key to decrypt the sought after 
database password.259 While this is just one type of brute force 
attack, this analogy shows that the execution of any brute force 
attack is incredibly complex.260  
On top of the intricacy of a brute force attack, it is also 
expensive and time consuming.261 Most passwords today are 
encrypted with 256-bit encryption.262 The number “256” refers to 
the size of the encryption key, or the length of the “combination,” 
using the analogy above.263 Put numerically, there are 2256 possible 
combinations that the decryption “combination” could be.264 With 
that many possible combinations, a hacker could not feasibly sit 
for years and type each one in. Instead, the hacker would either 
download software to do it for her or, if she is sophisticated enough, 
develop her own software.265 Regardless, she then needs the raw 
computing power to run the software quickly, so as to make the 
“decryption” process efficient enough to be valuable.266 Amateur 
hackers will usually purchase bot nets, which spread the 
processing power over millions of machines, or purchase 
                                                                                                     
 257. Cf. id. (same). 
 258. Cf. id. (same). 
 259. Cf. id. (same). 
 260. See id. (explaining the complexity of brute force attacks). 
 261. See id. (describing the cost and time investment required to effectuate a 
brute force attack). 
 262. See David Bisson, The Evolution of 256-bit Encryption and Security 
Certificates, VENAFI (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.venafi.com/blog/evolution-256-
bit-encryption-and-security-certificates (“Most organizations require their 
employees use AES 256-bit encryption.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 263. See 256-Bit Encryption, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/ 
definition/29703/256-bit-encryption (last visited Feb. 21, 2018) (“256-bit 
encryption is refers to the length of the encryption key used to encrypt a data 
stream or file”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 264. See id. (“A hacker or cracker will require 2256 different combinations to 
break a 256-bit encrypted message.”). 
 265. See How to Crack Passwords, NULL BYTE, supra note 243 (listing the 
various software packages available to wannabe hackers, including “John the 
Ripper,” “Ophcrack,” and many others)  
 266. See id. (describing how much computer power is necessary to effectuate 
a brute force hack). 
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specialized equipment.267 Both of these options are incredibly 
expensive.268 For example, Black Arrow Software produces a 
special device that performs these type of brute force attacks.269 It 
costs $350,000.270 Consequently, the time and money investment 
to attack major corporations can be massive.271 Because of this, 
very few individuals will attempt to hack enterprises unless they 
are seeking profit, either by selling the information to the highest 
bidder or the company is paying them to test the security. 
The other database attack strategy mentioned above is to 
install a trojan horse virus within the system.272 A trojan horse 
virus takes its name from the mythical trojan horse in the Iliad.273 
Like the mythical “horse,” the virus presents itself as something 
familiar and attempts to remain undetected until activated by the 
hacker.274 When the virus gets activated, it can do a number of 
things, depending on what its creator intends for it to do.275 This 
could include opening a backdoor for the hacker, giving the hacker 
unfettered access to the network; scanning the system for 
passwords and valuable information; logging key strokes; and 
more.276 
                                                                                                     
 267. See id. (listing the possible ways that wannabe hackers will increase 
their computer power). 
 268. See, e.g., Scrypt ASICs, BLACK ARROW INFO. TECH., 
http://www.blackarrowsoftware.com/store/litecoin-asics/ (last visited Feb. 21, 
2018) (listing their brute force specialized machine for $350,000) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 269. See id. (same). 
 270. See id. (same). 
 271. See, e.g., id. (same).  
 272. See CERRUDO & FAYO, supra note 241 (listing the most popular methods 
by which hackers illicitly access databases). 
 273. See Trojan Horse Definition, TECHTERMS, https://techterms.com/ 
definition/trojanhorse (last visited Feb. 21, 2018) (defining the term “trojan horse” 
in the computer virus context) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil 
Rights & Social Justice). 
 274. See id. (“Trojan horses are software programs that masquerade as 
regular programs, such as games, disk utilities, and even antivirus programs. But 
if they are run, these programs can do malicious things to your computer.”). 
 275. See id. (detailing ways the trojan horse can infiltrate software). 
 276. See, e.g., JAMIE CRAPANZANO, DECONSTRUCTING SUBSEVEN, THE TROJAN 
HORSE OF CHOICE 3 (2003) https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/ 
malicious/deconstructing-subseven-the-trojan-horse-of-choice-953 (detailing the 
Trojan Horse SubSeven’s capabilities including, turning on webcams, abort 
programs, and usurp instant messaging services) (on file with the Washington & 
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As one could imagine, these trojan horse viruses are 
complicated to create and utilize.277 The virus’ code must account 
for the target’s antivirus system278, and, with large enterprises, 
these antivirus systems are usually advanced.279 So, to counteract 
these heightened antiviruses, a trojan horse viruse would have to 
be coded to mutate itself into something else once it was 
downloaded onto the target computer so as to avoid detection.280 
This is known as polymorphic coding.281 The sophistication of this 
coding generally requires that the code be custom-made for the 
hacker’s target.282 All of this takes significant amounts of time and 
skill.283 Like with brute force attacks, the requisite costs involved 
in a trojan horse attack indicate that hackers who illicitly gain 
access to enterprise databases through trojan horse viruses 
presumptively intend to misuse the compromised data. 
These two methods of attack are not the only ways by which a 
hacker could illegally access databases, but are some of the most 
common methods.284 However, like the two examples presented 
above, each type of attack requires immense knowledge, time, and 
                                                                                                     
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 277. See SebastianZ, supra note 243 (“Trojans are generally created by 
malware authors who are organized and aim to make money out of their efforts. 
These types of Trojans can be highly sophisticated and can require more work to 
implement than some of the simpler malware seen on the Internet.”). 
 278. Antivirus systems are incredibly complex, but they all distill down to 
comparing files or parts of files to known virus signatures. See Chris Hoffman, 
How Antivirus Software Work, HOW-TO-GEEK (Sept. 26, 2016), 
https://www.howtogeek.com/125650/htg-explains-how-antivirus-software-works/ 
(describing how anti-virus systems work) (on file with the Washington & Lee 
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 279. See AVAST SOFTWARE, INC., AVAST BUSINESS ENDPOINT PROTECTION 
SOLUTIONS - WINDOWS, 1–2 (2017) (listing the various enterprise antivirus 
capabilities).  
 280. See Polymorphic Virus, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/ 
definition/4055/polymorphic-virus (last visited Feb. 21, 2018) (“A polymorphic 
virus is a complicated computer virus that affects data types and functions. It is 
a self-encrypted virus designed to avoid detection by a scanner. Upon infection, 
the polymorphic virus duplicates itself by creating usable, albeit slightly modified, 
copies of itself.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & 
Social Justice). 
 281. See id. (defining polymorphic viruses). 
 282. Id. 
 283. See id. (same). 
 284. See CERRUDO & FAYO, supra note 241 (listing the most popular methods 
by which hackers illicitly access databases). 
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money.285 The difficulty and costs alone should indicate ill-intent 
when someone unlawfully accesses confidential databases.286 
Notwithstanding that, the Non-Standing Cases’ opinions seems to 
imply that the hackers could have accidentally accessed this 
information.287 Indeed, the Fourth Circuit in Beck specifically 
stated, “the . . . Plaintiffs have uncovered no evidence that 
the . . . thief stole the laptop with the intent to steal their private 
information.”288 It is unclear how the Plaintiffs in that case would 
have proven such a fact—being that the hacker was not known at 
the time—but, because of that, the Fourth Circuit ruled that there 
was no standing.289 The Eight Circuit likewise concluded so in In 
re SuperValu, Inc.290 
In Reilly, the Third Circuit egregiously focused on this false 
conclusion.291 Again, the court in Reilly stated that on 
approximately December 22, 2009, “Ceridian suffered a security 
breach. An unknown hacker infiltrated Ceridian’s Powerpay 
system and potentially gained access to personal and financial 
information belonging to Appellants and approximately 27,000 
employees at 1,900 companies. It is not known whether the hacker 
read, copied, or understood the data.”292 The Third Circuit then 
                                                                                                     
 285. See id. (highlighting the difficulty of hacking corporate databases). 
 286. Cf. id. (same). 
 287. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[P]laintiffs 
have uncovered no evidence that . . . the thief stole the laptop with the intent to 
steal their private information.”); see also In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 769 
(8th Cir. 2017) (requiring Plaintiffs to specifically allege that their information 
was stolen instead of presuming it); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 44 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (“Here, there is no evidence that the intrusion was intentional or 
malicious.”). 
 288. Beck, 848 F.3d at 274. 
 289. See id. at 276 (concluding that for Plaintiffs to suffer harm, there must 
be an attenuated chain of events by third parties; this defeats standing). 
 290. See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 770 (8th Cir. 2017) (“[O]thers 
have ruled that a complaint could plausibly plead that the theft of a plaintiff’s 
personal or financial information [inherently] creates a substantial risk that they 
will suffer identity theft sufficient to constitute a[n] . . . injury . . . we conclude 
that plaintiffs have not done so here.”). 
 291. See Reilly, 664 F.3d at 42 (“Appellants’ contentions rely on speculation 
that the hacker: (1) read, copied, and understood their personal information; 
(2) intends to commit future criminal acts by misusing the information; and (3) is 
able to use such information to the detriment of appellants by making 
unauthorized transactions in Appellants’ names.”). 
 292. Id. at 40. 
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noted that Ceridian’s own investigation determined that the threat 
was sufficient enough to send out letters to the affected 
individuals.293 Nevertheless, the Third Circuit concluded that 
plaintiffs do not have standing because it is only “speculation” to 
think that the hacker got the information and then wanted to 
abuse it.294 Ultimately, the Third Circuit said, “[a]ny damages that 
may occur here are entirely speculative and dependent on the skill 
and intent of the hacker,” even though the hackers clearly had 
enough skill to hack Ceridian’s database to begin with.295  
In the Non-Standing Cases, the courts’ failures to presume 
that the hackers had ill-intent in hacking the various defendants’ 
databases is incorrect, given the difficulty and costs of hacking.296 
Further buttressing this point, hacking itself is illegal.297 While it 
remains theoretically possible that the hacker(s) in the 
Non-Standing Cases had no ill-intent; logically, this possibility is 
vastly outweighed by the large probability that the hacker(s) do 
have ill-intent. Why else would the hackers go to the trouble of 
performing the hack and expose themselves to criminal liability? 
The Seventh Circuit in Remijas put it well: “Why else would 
hackers break into a store’s database and steal consumers’ private 
information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or 
later, to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’ 
identities.”298 
The procedural burden that some courts thrust upon 
prospective plaintiffs to prove that the hacker both copied and 
plans to misuse the data is not only unnecessary, as shown 
above,299 it presents a nearly insurmountable burden. To prove 
                                                                                                     
 293. See id. (“Ceridian sent letters to the potential identity theft victims, 
informing them of the breach . . . .”).  
 294. See id. at 42 (“Appellants’ contentions rely on speculation that the 
hacker: (1) read, copied, and understood their personal information; (2) intends to 
commit future criminal acts by misusing the information; and (3) is able to use 
such information to the detriment of appellants by making unauthorized 
transactions in Appellants’ names.”). 
 295. Id. at 45. 
 296. See CERRUDO & FAYO, supra note 241 (explaining the difficulties 
associated with hacking). 
 297. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012) (stating that knowingly hacking without 
authorization is illegal). 
 298. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 
2015). 
 299. See supra notes 241–88 and accompanying text (indicating that courts 
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that the hacker stole information, much less plans to misuse it, the 
plaintiffs would, at the very least, need access to the servers that 
were hacked.300 They would then need to have an expert go over 
the data and see if there are any traces of copying left.301 
Sometimes there may not be.302 The largest obstacle, however, is 
that they would need all of this before they got through the court 
doors.303 The prospective plaintiffs would not have civil discovery 
powers, and the company is certainly incentivized to block access 
to avoid a lawsuit.304 Either way, the plaintiffs are left penniless 
and holding the bag for something that they had nothing to do with 
and could not have stopped, even if they tried. 
The Standing Cases’ courts agreed with this argument.305 The 
Sixth Circuit said in Galaria, “[w]here a data breach targets 
personal information, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the 
                                                                                                     
should presume that hackers have ill intent when they hack an enterprise 
database). 
 300. See How Do I Know if My Server has Been Hacked, SERVERPRONTO: U. 
(July 08, 2015), https://www.serverpronto.com/spu/2015/07/how-do-i-know-if-my-
server-has-been-hacked/ (listing the ways that someone can tell if her server has 
been hacked, all of which require access to the server) (on file with the 
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 301. See id. (“The truth, though, is that usually when you’re hacked, there’s 
no obvious sign. Hackers work hard to ensure their victims are unaware of what 
has happened until it’s too late, if ever.”). 
 302. See Kraft Kennedy, TeraCopy Forensics: Finding the Elusive “Copy Log”, 
KRAFT KENNEDY (April 25, 2017), https://www.kraftkennedy.com/teracopy-
forensics-finding-elusive-copy-log/ (indicating that evidence of copying files from 
a server can disappear quickly) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of 
Civil Rights & Social Justice). 
 303. Cf. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 271–72 (1979) (addressing preliminary 
questions of standing before addressing the merits of the case, even though 
neither party challenged standing). 
 304. Cf. id. (same). 
 305. See Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 663 Fed. App’x 384, 388 (6th 
Cir. 2016) (“Where a data breach targets personal information, a reasonable 
inference can be drawn that the hackers will use the victims’ data 
for . . . fraudulent purposes.”); see also Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 
794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is plausible to infer that the plaintiffs have 
shown a substantial risk of harm from the . . . data breach.”); Krottner v. 
Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Plaintiffs-Appellants have 
alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of 
a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data.”); Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 
865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[A] substantial risk of harm exists already, 
simply by virtue of the hack and the nature of the data that the plaintiffs allege 
was taken.”). 
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hackers will use the victims’ data for . . . fraudulent purposes.”306 
The Seventh Circuit similarly stated in Remijas, “it is plausible to 
infer that the plaintiffs have shown a substantial risk of harm from 
the . . . data breach.”307 The Ninth Circuit also ruled similarly in 
Krottner, “Plaintiffs-Appellants have alleged a credible threat of 
real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop 
containing their unencrypted personal data.”308 Lastly, in Attias, 
the D.C. Circuit also agreed, saying, “a substantial risk of harm 
exists already, simply by virtue of the hack and the nature of the 
data that the plaintiffs allege was taken.”309 
Courts should conclude that when there is a major hack of an 
enterprise, there is a presumption that the hacker not only stole 
the accessed data, but also plans to misuse it.310 This could, of 
course, be rebutted by the defendant enterprises, but the burden 
should be on them.311 They alone possess the information capable 
to do this.312 This presumption would grant standing in data 
breach cases—unless the defendant rebuts this presumption—by 
satisfying the U.S. Supreme Court’s tests regarding risk of future 
injury.313 There is no attenuated chain of possible future actions by 
a third party that would cause actual injury; there is a very real 
and almost inevitable chance that someone will have her identity 
stolen due to the data breach.314 
                                                                                                     
 306. Galaria, 663 F. App’x 3d. at 388. 
 307. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693. 
 308. Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1143. 
 309. Attias, 865 F.3d at 629. 
 310. See supra notes 241–86 (indicating that courts should presume that 
hackers have ill intent when they hack an enterprise database). 
 311. See id. (same). 
 312. See How Do I Know if My Server has Been Hacked, SERVERPRONTO, supra 
note 302 (listing the ways that someone can tell if her server has been hacked, all 
of which require access to the server). 
 313. Cf. supra notes 241–86 (indicating that courts should presume that 
hackers have ill intent when they hack an enterprise database). 
 314. Cf. id. (same). 
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B. Courts Should Focus on the Actual Hacking Event to 
Determine Injury, Rather than If the Future Injury has Occurred 
In the Non-Standing Cases, the Circuit Courts focus on 
whether there has been an actual identity theft at the time of the 
suit.315 The Third Circuit explicitly states this, saying, “[i]n data 
breach cases where no misuse is alleged . . . there has been no 
injury.”316 The Fourth and Eighth Circuits similarly ruled.317 
These courts are not focusing on the correct injury. There are two 
reasons why: (1) The issue at hand is not whether the plaintiffs’ 
identity was stolen, but that plaintiffs’ data was stolen from the 
defendant entities; and (2) focusing on the question of whether a 
plaintiff’s identity has been stolen creates a circular logic loop out 
of which plaintiffs could never break. In the Standing Cases, the 
circuit courts all came to this conclusion.318 
Courts generally only worry themselves with the two parties 
before them.319 With that logic, courts will only focus on the actions 
of the parties before them in adjudicating any dispute.320 Yet, in 
                                                                                                     
 315. See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 274 (4th Cir. 2017) (“[P]laintiffs 
make no such claims [of misuse]. This in turn renders their contention of an 
enhanced risk of future identity theft too speculative.”); see also In re SuperValu, 
Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 769–71 (8th Cir. 2017) (focusing on whether future identity 
theft has occurred); Reilly v. Ceridian, 664 F.3d 38, 44 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Appellants 
have alleged no misuse, and therefore, no injury.”). 
 316. Reilly, 664 F.3d at 45. 
 317. See Beck, 848 F.3d at 274 (explaining that Plaintiffs make no claims of 
misuse or certainly impending misuse of Plaintiffs’ personal information, 
defeating plaintiffs’ standing); see also In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d at 769–71 
(focusing on whether future identity theft as occurred). 
 318. See Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 391 (6th 
Cir. 2016) (finding that Plaintiffs have standing to sue when focusing on the 
hacking injury); see also Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 
693 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[I]t is plausible to infer that the plaintiffs have shown a 
substantial risk of harm from the Neiman Marcus data breach.”); Krottner v. 
Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Plaintiffs-Appellants have 
alleged a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of 
a laptop containing their unencrypted personal data.”); Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 
865 F.3d 620, 629 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“No long sequence of uncertain 
contingencies . . . has to occur before the plaintiffs in this case will suffer any 
harm; a substantial risk of harm exists already, simply by virtue of the hack and 
the nature of the data that the plaintiffs allege was taken.”). 
 319. Cf., e.g., Gordon v. Biden, 606 F. Supp. 2d 11, 14 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(dismissing a case because the injury was attributable to third-party actions 
which were not before the court). 
 320.  Cf. id. (same). 
280 25 WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 243 (2018)  
 
these types of cases, the Non-Standing Cases required the hackers 
to have acted in a particular way at the time of the litigation for 
there to be sufficient injury to grant standing.321 This goes against 
the logic that courts generally follow and against the adversarial 
process.322 Courts should, instead, focus on actions that defendants 
took or did not take that put plaintiffs in the position they sit. 
Turning to the second reason, as mentioned several times in 
this note, there are three requirements for standing: Injury-in-fact, 
causation, and redressability.323 While the bulk of this note has 
focused on the injury aspect of the tripartite standing scheme, if 
courts analyze the injury in these types of cases to only exist if 
their identity had been stolen at the outset of litigation, the 
question then becomes: Did the defendant entity cause the identity 
theft? While the Supreme Court has implied that the causation 
element of standing is not as strict as needed to create liability in 
tort, it is still a necessary element of standing.324 If the harmed 
individuals must wait until they are hurt before being able to sue, 
it becomes an almost insurmountable burden to plead and later 
prove the causation element.325 The Seventh Circuit in Remijas 
noted this exact problem:  
Requiring the plaintiffs “to wait for the threatened harm to 
materialize in order to sue” would create a different problem: 
“[T]he more time that passes between a data breach and an 
instance of identity theft, the more latitude a defendant has to 
                                                                                                     
 321. See cases cited supra note 315 and accompanying text (listing how the 
Non-Standing Cases’ courts focused on whether the plaintiffs’ identities had been 
stolen). 
 322. Cf. Gordon, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 14 (dismissing a case because the injury 
was attributable to third-party actions which were not before the court). 
 323. See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (“First, the 
plaintiff must have suffered an ‘injury in fact’ . . . . Second, there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of . . . . Third, it must 
be likely, as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by 
a favorable decision.”). 
 324. Cf. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 
125–26, 134 (finding that the causation element of standing was satisfied, but 
defendant’s actions may not have proximately caused plaintiff’s injuries). 
 325. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 
2015) (indicating that forcing plaintiffs to wait until they are truly harmed would 
create an almost insurmountable burden for plaintiffs). 
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argue that the identity theft is not ‘fairly traceable’ to the 
defendant’s data breach.”326 
Consequently, if courts force plaintiffs to wait until the future 
injury occurs, the causation element of standing becomes more 
tenuous.327 However, if courts were to focus on the actual hack 
instead, the Non-Standing Cases’ courts would rule that there is 
no injury.328 Either way, the plaintiffs would not have standing. 
This circular logic would continue to go around and around, leaving 
injured plaintiffs without redress. The only way to escape the loop 
is to focus on the data breach and conclude—like the circuit courts 
which decided the Standing Cases did—that the significantly 
increased chance of future injury is sufficient injury to satisfy 
constitutional standing.329 
Reiterating this logic, the Government Accountability Office 
issued a report that stated, “stolen data may be held up to a year 
or more before being used to commit identity theft. Further, once 
stolen data have been sold or posted on the Web, fraudulent use of 
that information may continue for years.”330 This precisely 
illuminates the danger of waiting for the actual future injury to 
occur: If the plaintiffs must wait for the damage, they could be 
waiting for years.331 As the Seventh Circuit notes, “‘the more time 
that passes between a data breach and an instance of identity 
theft, the more latitude a defendant has to argue that the identity 
theft is not “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s data breach.’”332 
Ultimately, courts analyzing this issue should focus on the hacking 
                                                                                                     
 326. Id. at 693 (quoting In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 
1215 n. 5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2014)).  
 327. See id. (noting the difficulty in proving causation if the court waits until 
the hack occurs). 
 328. Cf. cases cited supra notes 319–27 and accompanying text (discussing 
the Non-Standing Case courts’ focus on whether there has been an actual identity 
theft at the time of the suit). 
 329. See cases cited supra notes 305–109 and accompanying text (highlighting 
the Standing Cases courts’ presuming that the hacker has ill intent due to the 
nature of the hack). 
 330. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. GAO-07-737, REPORT TO 
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: PERSONAL INFORMATION 29 (2007). 
 331. See id. (describing how long it could take after a data breach for 
someone’s identity to be taken). 
 332. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(quoting In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 n. 5 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 4, 2014))). 
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event itself in determining where there is standing, not by what 
the hackers have done with the data at that point. 
C. Conclusion 
The courts should presume that a hacker not only accessed 
compromised information, but also stole and plans to misuse that 
information. While the defendant could always rebut the 
presumption with evidence to the contrary, putting the procedural 
burden upon plaintiffs makes it nearly impossible for plaintiffs to 
get through the doors of the courthouse.333 This leaves the injured 
individuals, whose information is exposed, without redress.334  
The courts should also not require plaintiffs to sit and wait for 
the third-party hacker to actually steal identities before plaintiffs 
can enter the courtroom.335 Otherwise, courts would in essence be 
ruling that defendants could not be liable until a third-party acts; 
a conclusion that is contrary to the American  legal system.336 Such 
a conclusion would also create circular logic: There could not be 
standing due to lack of injury until the third-party acts337; 
however, if the third-party hackers do act, it would make the 
causation element of standing difficult to prove at best.338 These 
requirements the Non-Standing Cases’ courts have erected cannot 
be correct. Instead, courts that analyze this issue should not pay 
attention to whether identity theft has yet occurred but should use 
the presumption explained above: The hack itself indicates a 
sufficient risk of future injury to constitute standing. 
                                                                                                     
 333. See supra notes 241–86 (indicating that courts should presume that 
hackers have ill intent when they hack an enterprise database). 
 334. Cf. id. (same). 
 335. See supra notes 323–32 and accompanying text (arguing that the hacking 
event is sufficient, and plaintiffs should not be forced to sit and wait for the injury 
to materialize). 
 336. Cf. id. (same). 
 337. See id. (same). 
 338. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 
2015) (indicating that forcing plaintiffs to wait until they are truly harmed would 
create an almost insurmountable burden for plaintiffs). 
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IV. Alternatives to Satisfy the Injury-in-Fact Requirement  
A. Breach of Privacy 
Common law has long protected a person’s right to privacy, 
but the lines have not been clearly delineated.339 The Second 
Restatement of Torts [hereinafter “Restatement”] attempted to 
clear up this ambiguity by stating that the “right of privacy has 
been defined as the right to be let alone.”340 Furthermore, the 
Restatement made four separate causes of action that revolved 
around this theoretical “right to privacy”: Intrusion upon seclusion, 
appropriation of name or likeness, publicity given to private life, 
and publicity placing a person in a false light.341  
Of the ones listed above, the most applicable cause of action 
for these types of data breach cases is an intrusion upon 
seclusion.342 The Restatement states, “[o]ne who intentionally 
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of 
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to 
the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person.”343 It is important to note 
that the comments clearly explain that this “invasion” does not 
need to be physical, but can be done by using someone’s senses, 
with or without a mechanical aid.344 This cause of action also does 
not turn upon whether there was publicity given to the stolen 
material.345  
                                                                                                     
 339. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1977) 
(explaining the history of a common law right to privacy). 
 340. Id. 
 341. See id. at § 652A (“The right of privacy is invaded by unreasonable 
intrusion upon the seclusion of another . . . or . . . appropriation of the other's 
name or likeness . . . unreasonable publicity given to the other's private 
life . . . or . . . publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before 
the public.”). 
 342. Cf. id. at § 652B (defining an intrusion into seclusion as an invasion into 
private affairs, such as stealing personal information). 
 343. Id. 
 344. See id. at § 652B cmt. b (“The invasion may be by physical intrusion . . . . 
It may also be by the use of the defendant’s senses, with or without mechanical 
aids, to oversee or overhear the plaintiff’s private affairs.”). 
 345. See id. at § 652B cmt. a (“The form of invasion of privacy covered by this 
Section does not depend upon any publicity given to the person whose interest is 
invaded or to his affairs.”). 
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Following this logic and applying those legal principles, if you, 
hypothetically, were to have your bank account information—
which was written on a piece of paper and stored within a safe in 
your house—stolen, but the paper left in the safe, you have a cause 
of action for intrusion into seclusion.346 Beyond that, you would 
have sufficient injury to pursue a claim against the safe 
manufacturer if the safe was defective and allowed the criminal to 
steal your bank account number.347 However, when that same 
exact information is stolen from a bank’s servers, the 
Non-Standing Cases’ courts would say that you have no standing 
to sue the bank that may have negligently allowed the hacker to 
take the information.348 This is illogical and should not remain. 
While the exact contours of this “right to privacy” still need to be 
examined, the current body of law should at least recognize 
standing in these data breach cases. 
B. Personal Data Should Be Recognized Property 
The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.349 The U.S. Supreme Court has said that 
these protections extend to personal information, such as GPS 
locations.350 However, the Fourth Amendment does not specifically 
state any protection for personal information. Instead, it lists 
persons, houses, paper, and effects.351 Nevertheless, courts have 
                                                                                                     
 346. Cf. id. at § 652B (listing the elements for intrusion into seclusion cause 
of action). 
 347. Cf. Redman v. Sentry Group, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 180, 185 (W.D. Va. 1995) 
rev’d on other grounds, Redman v. John D. Brush & Co., 111 F.3d 1174 (4th Cir. 
1997) (allowing the plaintiff to sue the safe manufacturer when the plaintiff’s safe 
was defectively made, allowing a thief to steal coins inside). 
 348. Cf. cases cited supra note 77 (listing the Non-Standing Cases and the 
reasons why those courts failed to find standing). 
 349. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”). 
 350. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (“We hold that the 
Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that 
device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”). 
 351. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”). 
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still interpreted this list to include personal information.352 The 
only logical way to resolve this incongruency is to conclude that 
personal information is a type of property protected under the 
Fourth amendment. However, in the context of these data breach 
cases, the Non-Standing Cases abandon the concept that personal 
information is a type of private property.353 If they had not 
abandoned this concept, the courts would have found there to be 
sufficient injury to grant standing under a bailor-bailee theory.354 
Furthermore, there would be no need for any risk of future injury 
analysis; the initial hack is proof enough of injury.355 Again, while 
the exact contours of this property right still need to be delineated, 
the current body of law should at least recognize standing under a 
property right theory. 
V. Conclusion 
The circuit split that has emerged causes ambiguity and 
prevents injured plaintiffs from achieving relief.356 The current 
standing requirements that the Non-Standing Cases impose upon 
plaintiffs present nearly insurmountable burdens.357 It is time for 
courts to rule like the Standing Cases.358 First, courts should 
presume, for standing purposes, that when a hacker perpetuates a 
hack upon an enterprise and accesses a confidential database, the 
                                                                                                     
 352. See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (“We hold that the Government's 
installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use of that device to 
monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a ‘search.’”). 
 353. Cf. cases cited supra note 77 (listing the Non-Standing Cases and the 
reasons why those courts failed to find standing). 
 354. Cf., e.g., Cont’l Nat’l Am. Grp. v. Valley Line Co., 420 F. Supp. 568, 570 
(implying that there was standing to sue because there was a bailor-bailee 
relationship). 
 355. Cf. id. (implying that there was standing to sue because there was a 
bailor-bailee relationship). 
 356. See cases cited supra note 43 and accompanying text (listing the circuit 
split regarding data breach cases). 
 357. See Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 
2015) (indicating that forcing plaintiffs to wait until they are truly harmed would 
create an almost insurmountable burden for plaintiffs); see also cases cited supra 
note 77 (listing the Non-Standing Cases and the reasons why those courts failed 
to find standing). 
 358. See cases cited supra note 77 (explaining why the Standing Cases’ courts 
ruled as they did). 
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hacker copied the information and plans to misuse it.359 Second, 
courts should only focus upon the hacking event when determining 
if there is injury, not upon whether the hacker, a third-party to the 
litigation, has yet effectuated an identity theft.360 The hack alone, 
because of the presumption listed above, should provide a 
sufficient risk of future injury to satisfy the Supreme Court’s 
standing jurisprudence.361 In the alternative, courts should start 
to recognize that the harmed individuals have standing to sue the 
hacked enterprise because these types of data breaches violate the 
common law of intrusion into seclusion.362 Further, courts should 
begin to recognize that an individual’s private information is that 
individual’s property.363 Such a conclusion would allow the courts 
to avoid these difficult future injury inquiries and always find 
standing for the affected individuals.364 Regardless of the route 
that the courts decide to take, plaintiffs, whose personal 
information was exposed, deserve, at the very least, to get through 
the court’s doors. 
                                                                                                     
 359. See supra notes 241–86 and accompanying text (indicating that courts 
should presume that hackers have ill intent when they hack an enterprise 
database). 
 360. See supra notes 319–32 and accompanying text (arguing that the hacking 
event is sufficient to grant standing and plaintiffs should not be forced to sit and 
wait for the injury to materialize). 
 361. Compare id. (arguing that the hacking event is sufficient and plaintiffs 
should not be forced to sit and wait for the injury to materialize), and supra notes 
241–88 and accompanying text (indicating that courts should simply presume 
that hackers have ill intent when they hack an enterprise database), with cases 
cited supra notes 45–75 (explaining the current constitutional standing 
jurisprudence). 
 362. See supra notes 341–48 and accompanying text (arguing that courts 
should recognize that an individual has standing to sue the hacked enterprise 
through an intrusion into seclusion cause of action). 
 363. See supra notes 351–58 and accompanying text (arguing that courts 
should recognize that an individual’s personal information is property). 
 364. Cf., e.g., Continental Nat’l Am. Group v. Valley Line Co., 420 F. Supp. 
568, 570 (implying that there was standing to sue because there was a 
bailor-bailee relationship). 
